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MONTENEGRO – ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SECESSION  
On 21 May 2006 Montenegro organised a referendum on independence in line with the 
provisions of Article 60 of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro. According to 
the results published by the Republic Referendum Commission on 31 May, 86.5% of those 
eligible to vote took part in the referendum and 55.5% of voters supported independence. 
Thus the Montenegrin Parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence on 3 June (formally 
celebrating independence on July 12). Along with the European Union, the United States, 
Croatia and other countries the Government of Serbia also officially recognized Montenegro on 
15 June. 
BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE 
Under a 2002 agreement Serbia and Montenegro have run their own economies, currencies 
forming customs union and remaining part of a decentralized state. Montenegro could develop 
and implement its own economic strategy, run its own public administration, central bank and 
banking system (10 licensed banks) thus seemingly there might be little changes after gaining 
sovereignty. Montenegro chose the way of liberalization, privatising most major industries 
other than electricity and implementing a flat corporate tax rate of 9% while adopting free-
market policies and EU and WTO rules of trade. However, similarly to Serbia the country faces 
excessive bureaucracy and corruption even if Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic has largely 
cleaned up economy from the smugglers’ haven tolerated by the West until 2000 because it 
resisted Slobodan Milosevic. Montenegro managed to reach macroeconomic stability which is 
also reflected by the revision of outlook of Standard & Poor’s on the Republic of Montenegro in 
December 2005 to positive from stable. The outlook change was based on the country’s good 
progress on economic and political reforms and the strong political support for the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement with the EU. 
TABLE  1. MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 2000-2005 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP growth (%)* 3.1 -0.2 1.7 2.3 3.7 4.1 
Inflation rate (%) 24.8 28 9.4 6.7 4.3 1.8 
Unemployment rate (%) 32.7 31.5 30.45 25.82 22.6 18.5 
Government deficit (% of GDP)* - - - -3.29 -2.18 -2.6 
FDI inflow (million €) - - 182.9 213.62 111.08 382.8 
Source: Central Bank of Montenegro, Economic Reform Agenda 2002-2007 
Economy could grow at a faster pace in the last year despite the fall in industrial production by 
1.9%, notably due to problems in the coal mine, the thermoelectric power plant and the 
steelworks. The most dynamic sectors were tourism and the financial sector. The government 
expects a yearly real GDP growth of 4.5% for 2006 and 2007. Inflation rate decreased 
significantly by 2.5 percentage points between 2004 and 2005 and the government managed 
to slowly decrease unemployment which remains still very high as almost fifth of the active 
population still does not have a job. Government deficit remained low in the last three years 
and there was a sharp 300% increase of inward FDI in 2005. This growth of inward FDI was 
thanks to the privatization of 3 major companies: Montenegrin Telekom (bought by the 
Hungarian Matav for EUR 147.6 millions), Podgorica aluminum plant (purchased by the Russian 
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Rusal for EUR 48.5 millions) and Podgoricka Bank (sold for the French Societe Generale Group 
for EUR 40 millions). Although the key indicators paint a positive picture of the country the 
share of grey economy is still 15% and there are major challenges remaining after declaring 
independence but also chances originating from getting rid of Serbian political burdens. 
CHANCES AND CHALLANGES 
There are two big advantages of independency. Firstly, Montenegrin decision makers can drop 
the independence issue from their agenda and can concentrate their efforts on economic 
growth and fiscal and microeconomic restructuring. Secondly, Montenegro can say goodbye to 
the stigma of Serbia’s failure to capture war crime suspects which suspended EU negotiations. 
After gaining sovereignty Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn asked EU foreign ministers for 
a new mandate to start negotiating with Montenegro. The speed of the EU accession process 
will depend only on Montenegro in the future and the country could race ahead of Serbia on 
the road to EU integration. 
Leaving behind the political tensions of war criminals and Kosovo there is a chance to improve 
tourism sector and attract more tourists in a peaceful, politically stable country with a 
spectacular coastline and beautiful mountainous areas. The government expects independence 
to fuel a doubling of Western tourists to 600,000 in 2006. Real estate market could also be 
boosted by the lost Serbian barriers of unstable political situation. Old buildings from the 
communist-era have been renovated and new hotels have been built. Real estate along the 
290-kilometer-long coast has been bought mostly by wealthy Russians. 
During the Milosevic era most of the Montenegrin industry was destroyed by the black market. 
These industries were sold off cheaply to foreign investors in the last 5-10 years. The process 
of privatisation was very successful as 100% of telecommunication, agriculture, services, oil 
import and distribution and capital market is in private ownership while tourism is mostly 
privately owned and only one local bank remained in state ownership. Privatisation will 
continue this year according to governmental plans concerning a thermo power plant, 
Pljealjska banka, a telecommunication company, leather industry, a recreational center and a 
shoe factory. However, there are only few state properties to sell (the most valuable ones in 
the energy sector). Inward FDI in the future cannot rely on privatisation thus the business 
environment needs to be improved, which is characterized by a bad infrastructure and 
economic corruption. The latter one originates from a fine network of personal connections, 
interrelations and dependencies due to the cosy size of the population (620,000 people). Until 
market transactions are dominated by insiders, corruption and enforcement of the rules cannot 
be defeated. Another challenge is the extreme size of the public sector. 60% of jobs is 
generated by this sector which leaves rather limited room for entrepreneurship and decreases 
the income of the government by insufficient number of private enterprises paying taxes.  
Foreign trade liberalization resulted in an average tariff of 2.5% (in Serbia the average rate of 
tariffs is 8.5%), but there are other barriers of import, which cause higher prices in 
Montenegro. Even though these barriers the country faces significant trade deficit because of 
the low competitiveness of the economy and the increased demand on imported products. As 
Montenegro is an open, non-diversified economy, the country is vulnerable to external shocks, 
in particular on aluminium prices and tourism inflows. In order to maintain macroeconomic 
stability in the long term the economy should be diversified and public administration 
downsized. 
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EXPECTATIONS 
The most urgent tasks are not economic issues. Montenegro needs to apply for membership in 
all those international organizations where Serbia and Montenegro had membership. The 
country became already a member of UN and applied for a membership in IMF. The process of 
gaining WTO membership (requiring further reforms and setting up of new institutions) needs 
to be continued and negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU 
have to be resumed. What is more, Montenegro needs to reach agreement with Serbia on 
bilateral relations, and pending political, economic and social questions related to the 
dissolution of the state union. Besides these tasks the country needs to form its own army and 
prepare it for integration with NATO. 
Concerning economy the government needs to make efforts towards diversification and 
decreasing unemployment (with help of the project Legalization of existing and opening of the 
new working places). As tourism and real estate sectors got a chance to improve governmental 
support is necessary in these industries. For the development of the small and middle sized 
enterprises and facilitating innovation, the following projects of the Economic Reform Agenda 
will be continued: “Enhance competitive abilities for the domestic companies”, “Industrial zone 
Bar”; “Made in Montenegro”; ” Technological park”, “Incubators”, and “Innovation centers”. To 
solve the problem of trade deficit the government should try to influence economy toward 
export and decrease irrational import. 
All in all independency could help Montenegro to restructure and boost its economy and 
increased the chance of becoming an EU member. However, without structural reforms, 
decreasing public administration, fighting corruption and developing a better business 
environment the country will not emerge from the family of the poor, former Yugoslavian 
Balkan countries. 
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SHADOW ECONOMY IN THE SEE COUNTRIES 
Shadow economy is hard to trace as it covers all economic activities that are not registered. 
However, there are some estimations for the extent of this phenomenon in the SEE countries. 
These estimations are inevitable as they can help governments to improve economic policies in 
order to reduce underground economy and increase public revenues. 
WHAT IS SHADOW ECONOMY? 
Shadow economy consists of all commerce that is not taxed. Thus it includes not only legally 
prohibited activities such as drugs, prostitution or gambling in some places but also trade in 
legal goods and services without reporting in order to avoid paying taxes. Shadow economy 
appears at the labour market as well in form of not reporting employees in order to save social 
security contributions. One kind of categorization can be seen in Table 2. 
TABLE  2. A TAXONOMY OF SHADOW ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
 
 Monetary transactions Non-monetary transactions 
Illegal activities 
Trade in stolen goods; drugs dealing and 
manufacturing; prostitution; gambling; 
smuggling and fraud 
Barter: drugs, stolen goods, smuggling, etc. 
Produce or growing drugs for own use. 
Theft for own use. 
Legal activities   
Tax evasion 
Unreported income from self-employment; 
Wages, salaries and assets from unreported 
work related to legal services and goods. 
Barter of legal services and goods 
Tax avoidance Employee discounts, fringe benefits All do-it-yourself work and neighbour help 
Source: Schneider – Enste: Shadow Economies 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
There are several factors influencing the extent of shadow economy. Firstly, high intensity of 
legal and administrative regulations, such as business registration, license, and permit 
requirements, can increase the intention of flight into the shadow economy. High overall tax 
and social security burden motivates employers and employees to move to the black labour 
market. The lack of trust in official institutions and the presence of administrative corruption 
(court system, unclear legislation and bureaucracy) are also barriers of “white economy”. In 
case property rights are not clear companies cannot access official financial institutions such as 
credits, insurance, etc. which undermine formal economy. Interestingly the reduction of weekly 
working time, part time work and the early retirement enable people to search for additional 
income in the shadow economy. The extent of shadow economy is not only influenced by 
administrative rules and financial legislation. The morale of people is also an important issue. A 
long-term decline in civic virtue and loyalty towards public institutions can lead to the increase 
of underground economy. Broad acceptance of illicit work also strengthens shadow economy. 
In the region of the SEE countries some of the above mentioned factors have stronger effect 
and because of their special history (young, former communist states, some of them gaining 
independency after a war period) there are some additional factors influencing shadow 
economy. Because of the young age of these countries the trust in official institutions is 
extremely low, as the administration is often incompetent, inefficient and corrupt. Property 
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rights are not always guaranteed and the enforcement of laws and regulations is inadequate. 
Because of the underdeveloped economic and democratic institutions, informal and unofficial 
institutions appear (including the mafia as well), some of them having negative effects on 
society, but others creating social structures which can support the weak official structures. 
High taxes are bigger motivation in the SEE countries to act in the shadow economy as there is 
no adequate supply of public goods and infrastructure in return. The decision on the flight to 
the shadow economy is a cost-benefit-calculation where illicit work and tax evasion are more 
attractive because of the low probability of being caught. 
Increasing proportion of shadow economy leads to decreased public revenues. Thus the 
governments will not be able to improve administration, public goods and infrastructure. The 
quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services will decrease, while the 
government tries to avoid it by increasing tax rates. Increased burdens accompanied by worse 
public services and infrastructure motivate more actors of the official economy to relocate its 
activities into the shadow economy. A vicious circle arises which can be hardly defeated. 
SIZE OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY IN THE SEE COUNTRIES 
The exact size of shadow economy as percentage of GDP is not possible to calculate. As the 
example of Albania shows, depending on the method used for estimating the extent of shadow 
economy very different results will emerge. In 2002 INSTAT estimated informal economy at 
25% of GDP while Schneider got 33% as a result. Latest estimates (2004) are between 30% 
and 60%. Bosnia and Herzegovina is in a quite similar situation. In 2001 shadow economy was 
estimated at 21% of GDP while 3 years later it was 58%. Macedonia and Montenegro belong 
also to those SEE countries that have very high shadow economies. In Macedonia the 
estimations are quite exact, as shadow economy was 39% of GDP in 2001 and 40.8% in 2003. 
In Montenegro estimations set shadow economy at 27% in 2001 but at 60% in 2004. In these 
countries reality could be in this interval. 
The other group of SEE countries also faces the problem of shadow economy, but it is not as 
extended as in the previous group. In Bulgaria estimations were between 16% (in 2000) and 
34% (in 2001). However, the Bulgarian government stated that shadow economy has recently 
dropped to 25%. The shadow economy of Croatia is similar, as estimates are between 23.5% 
(average of the years 1990-1993) and 32.4% in 2001. The government is very optimistic 
concerning defeating underground economy and intends to decrease it to 15% of GDP by the 
time of its EU accession. In case of Serbia according to the only available estimation shadow 
economy was 195 of GDP in 2001. Last but not least Romania is catching up to these countries 
as shadow economy decreased from 46% in 2001 to 25% in 2005. As a comparison informal 
economy was 18% of GDP in the Czech Republic, 21% in Hungary and 31% in Poland in 2001. 
According to the comparison of tax burden in the SEE countries those with relatively low 
burdens face lower shadow economy (Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia) and higher tax burden means 
more extended shadow economy (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina). Macedonia is an 
exception as the tax burden is low, but informal economy is widespread. Comparing tax 
burdens with EU member states there are countries with higher or equal tax rates but lower 
shadow economy. Thus it can be concluded that the young, unstable economies of the SEE 
countries do not have enough and efficient public services, administration and infrastructure, 
and the moral after the war period and the change of regime is also unsatisfactory. 
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TABLE  3. TAX BURDEN IN 2006 
 
Social security contribution   VAT Corporate tax Employer Employee 
Albania 20 20 30.7 11.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 17 30 28 10 
Bulgaria 20 15 23.975 – 24.675 12.425 
Croatia 22 20 17.2  -  
Macedonia 18 15 11.3  -  
Romania 19 16 19.75 – 29.75 17 
Serbia 18 10 17.9 17.9 
Montenegro 17 9 16.1 20 
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
The governments of the region do not need to concentrate only on reducing tax rates. It is also 
an important step, as it will increase public revenues and the infrastructure, administration and 
public goods and services can be improved which can increase trust in the official institutions. 
Besides tax policy, legislations need to be simplified in order to make business life easier. 
Besides incentive measures the governments should strengthen control bodies, and aggravate 
punitive sanctions against participants of the shadow economy. This way the cost-benefit 
analysis could result in a decision for “white economy”. With the improvement of economic and 
social institutions and consequent penalties the moral of these young, vulnerable societies 
could also increase. This process takes long time and huge efforts, but as part of the 
preparation for EU membership it could be financially subsidised by the EU as well. At last, the 
vicious circle of shadow economy could be broken. 
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FIGHTING INFLATION IN SERBIA  
It has been many times stated that in Southeast Europe the two biggest macroeconomic 
problems are the high level of trade deficit and unemployment, but on the other hand the 
region performs a remarkable economic growth rate. All these stand for Serbia as well, but in 
addition it has a further problematic factor that needs to be combated, namely the inflation. 
Despite the strict fiscal policy and monetary policy attempts, the rate is still double-digit and it 
is expected to remain so in 2006 and 2007 as well, thus fighting inflation remains an important 
issue in the economic policy of Serbia. 
In 2005 GDP growth rate was 6.3%, mainly due to the service, trade and transport sector. In 
the first quarter of 2006 the growth remained high and was still bolstered mainly by the 
domestic demand, which was supported by the increased lending activity by banks. In the first 
six months of 2006, the growth of imports (23.6%) was higher than the increase of exports 
(18.9%). Public debt decreased recently and the budget turned to surplus. The restrictive fiscal 
policy allows only mild growth of wages and pension, which may help to mitigate the domestic 
demand and inflation. According to the Budget Act for 2006, budget surplus should amount to 
CSD 39.5 billion, but on the other hand, we must note that an election year is coming up, 
which may include certain risks. All these may be partly compensated by the ongoing 
privatisation process and the increasing FDI (recently Mobi 63 has been sold to Telenor for a 
record amount of EUR 1.5 billion). All these mentioned factors have an impact on the rate of 
inflation. 
The effectiveness of the central bank’s monetary policy measures is limited, due to the 
widespread euroisation in the banking sector. The phenomenon is the same like in the EU 
countries, so likewise in the case of the latter, the Serbian National Bank warned individuals 
about the potential dangers of foreign currency borrowing. Here we can mention the case of 
the exchange rate regime, where the central bank declared it “cannot and will not go against 
market forces”, thus it does not consider the exchange rate as “an instrument for increasing 
exports, nor is it a nominal anchor for inflation”. (Of course the bank does intervene 
occasionally – e.g. in August it bought USD 103 million to prevent the excessive strengthening 
of the dinar.) In general it can be stated that the revaluation of the dinar will not have 
significant effect on the inflation. As an other instrument against inflation, in August the central 
bank launched a third issue of savings bills, in the total nominal value of CSD 1 billion, subject 
to per annum interest rate of 19%, in order to stimulate household savings in dinar. The 
discount rate of the national bank remained unchanged at 8.5%. The currency in circulation 
decreased by 8.1% in July 2006, compared to December 2005, while in the same period, 
money supply M1 increased by 2.0% and M2 declined by 0.2%. Next chart shows how these 
three factors fluctuated during the recent months. 
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CHART  1. CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION, M1 AND M2 (IN MILLION DINARS, END OF PERIOD)* 
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Source: National Bank of Serbia; * M1 and M2 - including local government deposits; 
 
After mentioning some of the factors that influence the inflation in Serbia, let us see how the 
rate fluctuated since 2004. The following chart shows that the highest rates were measured in 
the last quarter of 2005. Since then the inflation has been rather declining – the per annum 
rate was 16.1% in May, 15.1% in June and 12.7% in July. One main cause of this decline is 
the fact, that the introduction of VAT has no more inflation boosting effects. 
 
CHART  2. INFLATION RATE IN SERBIA (%)* 
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Source: National Bank of Serbia ; *Annual rates, the current month against the same month of the previous year. 
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On the other hand, Serbia also faces the impacts of the increasing oil and basic metal prices. If 
we compare the first seven months of 2006 with the same period a year ago, we can see, that 
the largest increase can be observed in the category of “fuel and light” (17.7%), according the 
Statistical Office of the Republic. The category of “food” grew by 13.5%, “services” by 13.8%, 
while the overall category of “goods” increased by 14.0%. 
In order to increase the Serbian economy’s stability and viability, the reduction of inflation is a 
key issue among others. Although, certain attempts have been made by the national bank and 
the fiscal authority as well, the central bank’s target for 2006 to reduce inflation to the 
projected range from 9% to 10%, most probably will not be achieved. One of the main reasons 
for this is the structural problems of the Serbian economy, which includes among many the 
lack of competition in many fields (other reasons were mentioned in the former paragraphs). 
Structural imbalances ought to be treated parallel, nevertheless in order to ease the costs of 
the inflation reduction process. 
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ROMANIA ‘NEEDS’ HIGHER BUDGET DEFICIT 
The Romanian government has approved the planned budget on 28 June 2006, and due to this 
step the 0.9% budget deficit planned for this year will go up to 2.5%. The decision does not 
affect the macro factors, and the analysts do not wait for the significant increasing of the 
inflation as well.  
The completion comes from taxes and dues, and will be extended chiefly on infrastructural 
investments. Romania, as a European country needs to be integrated into the trans-European 
infrastructure network, which means that Romania has to make up its leeway on the fields of 
road-network, education and medical-system. In the future the project will be financed by 
European sources further. The exact separation of the budget-completion is the following: 
 
The subsidized field The amount in million RON 
Transport portfolio responsible for the road works 1705 
Ministry of Education 1300 
Medical portfolio 200 
Ministry of Agriculture 476 
Ministry of Labour 398,5 
Ministry of Home Affairs 514 
 
The Ministry of Education will provide the expansion of educational institutes and will discharge 
the payment defaults, and the Ministry of Home Affairs should set up an official army for 
Romania. 
The Romanian budget deficit has declined in the last 4 years to a record low of 0.8% of GDP in 
the last year, and has remained under the 3% threshold (appointed in Maastricht) since the 
year of 2002. These values clearly show that Romania has postponed the infrastructural 
investments for long years. The further clear evidence of the retention of the Romanian 
infrastructural investments financed by public funds that the introduction of the 16% tax 
system in the last year has no significant effect on the budget balance. 
Romania has achieved a substantial performance since 2000. The main driving force of the 
economic improvement was the fiscal adjustment, the enhanced financial performance of 
state-owned enterprises, and the process of privatisation. The performance of the National 
Bank of Romania (NBR) is also remarkable, it has achieved substantial disinflation while 
slowing the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate.  
TABLE  4. SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF ROMANIA 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 
Real GDP growth (%) 5.1 5.2 8.4 4.1 6.5 
GDP/capita (EUR, nominal) 2 224 2420 2805 3665 - 
Consumer prices, % 22.5 15.3 11.9 9.0 7.2 
General government balance (% of 
GDP) -2.6 -2.2 -1.2 -0.8 -1.0 
Source: ICEG EC, WIIW; * Forecasts 
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The Romanian economy is flourishing; it started its 6th year of consecutive economic growth 
with an impressive 6.9% yoy for the first quarter of 2006, almost 2%-points above the market 
expectations. The domestic demand is really strong, and according to the expectancies it will 
remain strong as the government will be forced to increase expenditure, especially on 
infrastructure.  
It is clear that the Romanian economy has walked a long way in the last 10, and especially in 
the last 5 years. After the fluctuation of the 90s, the GDP growth was increasing from 2000 
and after the 8.4% of the year 2004, in the face of the wasteful floods of the summer of 2005, 
it has extended by 4.1% in the last year. In 2000 the Romanian GDP/capita stood at the 
quarter of the European average, but for today it has increased to the tierce of the same 
indicator.  
For the Romanian population the most representative issue is that the NBR has decreased the 
inflation rate to a one-digit number. (The inflation rate of Romania has galloped from the 90s, 
it means that for example in 1997 it stood at 155 %). The unemployment rate is also 
decreasing (it is around 6%), and this trend could be explained with the great number of the 
citizens working abroad.  
The net wages increased as well. In 2005 the average monthly payment was about 215 euros, 
while the same value stood at 80 euros in 1995. But it is remarkable that the increase of the 
wages did not go hand in hand with expanding of the budget deficit, moreover, the deficit 
could be constrained below 1% of the GDP in the last year.  
The introduction of the 16% flat tax on personal income and profits led to a loss in collections 
of about 1% of GDP. This loss was offset by higher-than-budgeted indirect tax collections due 
to strong demand for goods and services.  
On the expenditure side, there were large overruns in the wage bill as a result of substantial 
increases in public sector wages (16-34 percent compared with the 2004 average), and 
significant cuts in capital expenditure. The recalculation of pensions for those retired before 
2001 increased government spending as well. Finally, there was a significant slackening of the 
fiscal policy in 2005, as the government repaid its arrears, supported damages caused by the 
floods, and injected capital into Exim Bank. But two things are undoubted: the Romanian 
budget deficit will remain below the Maastricht criteria in the face of the increased 
expenditures as well and Romania urgent needs these infrastructural and other expenditures 
to the preparing for the EU accession at the beginning of the next year. 
Romania needs substantial investments in infrastructure, in upgrading road networks. It needs 
to build new road networks, particularly the pan-European Corridor 4, and it needs to 
rehabilitate a number of secondary routes. 
Next to the budget funds, the Romanian economy can finance its infrastructural investments 
from EU funds too in the future. According to the decision of the European Union Romania will 
get 18.3 billion euros from the common funds between 2010 and 2013. From 2007 to 2009 the 
Romanian government will come in for 10.8 billion euros.  
Romania has to make up its leeway on the field of the infrastructure, and it is important in 
regard of the European financial supports for the future as well, because it can enjoy 
assistance from the cohesive funds of the European Union if it will work out programs for the 
infrastructure’s improvement, which are realistically feasible.  According to this statement 3.6 
billion euros will be available to spend in Romania between 2007 and 2009 per year. The same 
value for the period of 2010-2013 is 4,6 billion euros. So for Romania the higher state budget 
deficit is a logical investment for the future.  
ICEG EC – Corvinus – SEE Monitor 2006/8. 
. 
 
14 
FORMER ISSUE’S TABLE OF CONTENTS: 
 
 
Number 2006/7. 
▪ ICEG EC Quarterly Forecast on the Southeast European Countries, 2006 Second Quarter   
▪ Exchange rate development in Romania 
▪ Macroeconomic development in Croatia 
▪ Current Account Trends in the Southeast European Countries 
 
Number 2006/6. 
▪ First chapter closed in the accession negotiations between Croatia and the EU 
▪ FDI inflows in the Southeast European Countries 
▪ Poverty reduction in Albania 
▪ Decreasing public debt in Bulgaria 
 
Number 2006/5. 
▪ High economic growth in the SEE region in the last five years 
▪ Accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007 - Realistic? 
▪ Increasing inflation in Bulgaria 
▪ Significant drop in economic growth in Romania 
 
Number 2006/4. 
▪ Iceg Ec quarterly Forecast on Southeast European Countries 2006 first quarter 
▪ Kosovo in the way to final status 
▪ Slowly decreasing unemployment rate in Croatia 
▪ Foreign trade gap widens in Bulgaria 
 
Number 2006/3. 
▪ Heading to “Europe”? Stabilisation and Association Agreement in Serbia and Montenegro 
▪ Real estate market of Bulgaria 
▪ Albania signed The Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
▪ Tourism sector in Bulgaria 
 
Number 2006/2. 
ICEG EC – Corvinus – SEE Monitor 2006/8. 
. 
 
15 
▪ Bulldozer Initiative – ’50 economic reforms in 150 days’ 
▪ The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the European Integration 
▪ Bulgaria and Romania: One Year to Accession 
▪ Bulgaria faces a lasting demographic crisis 
 
Number 2006/1. 
▪ ICEG EC Quarterly forecast on the Southeast European Countries- Winter 2005 
▪ Balanced budget 2006 is planned in Bulgaria 
▪ VAT introduction in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
▪ Foreign Direct Investment in Serbia 
 
Number 2005/20. 
▪ Business Climate in Southeast European (SEE) countries in comparison with the New 
Member States 
▪ Romania - Development of the inflation rate 
▪ Tightening of credit expansion in Bulgaria 
 
 
 
Number 2005/19. 
▪ Foreign Direct Investments in the Southeast European (SEE) Countries in comparison 
with the 8 New Member States (NMS8) 
▪ Croatia - on the way on accession 
▪ The role of World Bank credits in the Fyr of Macedonia 
 
Number 2005/18. 
▪ Bulgaria: Inflation rate is the critical issue with regard to joining EMU after EU accession 
▪ Strong sector with strong performance: Tourism in Croatia 
▪ Inflation in Serbia and Montenegro in 2005-2006 
▪ The EU-Albania relations - The present engagement of the SAA 
 
Number 2005/17. 
▪ Intra-regional Trade in Southeast Europe 
▪ Inflation in Bulgaria in 2005 and 2006 
▪ Still High Foreign Direct Investments Inflow in the Romanian Economy 
ICEG EC – Corvinus – SEE Monitor 2006/8. 
. 
 
16
▪ Deep Overview of FDI Movements in Croatia 
 
Number 2005/16. 
▪ ICEG EUROPEAN CENTER Quarterly Forecast on the Southeast European Countries (Q3 
2005) - Outlook for 2005 and 2006 
▪ (Un)employment in the Southeast European Countries I. & II.  
▪ GDP Growth Rate of Bulgaria in the first half of 2005  
 
Number 2005/15. 
▪ Bulgaria and Romania en route to the European Union 
▪ Agricultural Sector in South Eastern European Countries II. 
▪ Romania: Slower Economic Growth in the first half of 2005 
  
Number 2005/13-14. 
▪ The Powerful Nature - The Romanian Floods 
▪ Current Account Development in Bulgaria: Big Problem at First Glance 
▪ VAT Increase in Romania- A Makeshift 
▪ The Start of the Improvement in the Albanian Electricity Sector 
 
Number 2005/12. 
▪ The British EU-Presidency and the Prospect of the Future Enlargement of the EU 
▪ Credit Boom and Increasing External Vulnerability in Bulgaria and Romania 
▪ High ISPA Subsidy for Romania 
▪ A Further Step Towards Europe - Introducing VAT In Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Number 2005/11. 
▪ Agricultural Sector in South Eastern European Countries I. - Albania, Bulgaria and 
Romania  
▪ Balance of Payments in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
▪ New Leu and the Future in Romania 
▪ Croatia's Accession Negotiation with EU - Developments in European Integration 
  
Number 2005/10. 
▪ Tax Regimes in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania 
▪ The Impacts of General Election on the Economic Policy of Bulgaria 
ICEG EC – Corvinus – SEE Monitor 2006/8. 
. 
 
17
▪ Worsening Current Account Balance in Romania 
▪ The Attractive Bulgaria - Prominent FDI Inflow in 2004 
  
Number 2005/9. 
▪ EU Begin Talks with Serbia and Montenegro 
▪ Tax Regimes in the FYR of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro 
▪ Tax Regimes in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
▪ Interest Rate Policy in Romania: 10 Percent Off in 5 Months 
 
Number 2005/8. 
▪ More EU Assistance for the Western Balkans 
▪ One Step Closer to EU Membership 
▪ Bulgaria Reached Record GDP Growth in 2004 
▪ The Development of Public and External Debt in Croatia 
 
Number 2005/7. 
▪ South Eastern Europe after EU Enlargement and before Accession 
▪ Bulgaria: Fixed Exchange Rate of Currency Board and the Competitiveness 
▪ Bulgarian Tourism Industry 
▪ Plans on the Albanian Privatisation Process 
 
Number 2005/6. 
▪ Development of Inflation in Southeast European Countries 
▪ IMF versus the Romanian Government 
▪ 8.3% GDP Growth in 2004 in Romania – Positive Signals for Investors 
▪ Higher Inflation and Trade Deficit in Serbia 
 
Number 2005/5. 
▪ Tax Reduction Suggested in Bulgaria 
▪ Croatia: Delays in Starting Accession Negotiations? 
▪ Tourism in Croatia 
▪ Montenegro Wants to Lead its Fortune under its own Hand 
 
Number 2005/4. 
▪ Bulgaria: Record Foreign Trade Deficit in 2004 
ICEG EC – Corvinus – SEE Monitor 2006/8. 
. 
 
18
▪ Macroeconomic Targets in Romania for 2005 
▪ Montenegro: Budget in 2005 
▪ Albania – EU Accession in 2014? 
 
Number 2005/3. 
▪ World Bank Strategy for 2005-2008 – Assistance for Croatia 
▪ Record Budget Revenues in Bulgaria in 2004 – An Estimated Surplus of the Budget 
Again 
▪ Montenegro: Economic Policy Focuses on Privatisation 
▪ Macedonia – Status of European Integration One Year after Application 
 
Number 2005/2. 
▪ Origin and Structure of FDI Inflows into Bulgaria and Romania 
▪ Croatia: Stabilisation and Association Agreement will Come into Force on 1 February 
2005 
▪ Bank Privatisation in Serbia 
▪ Growing External Imbalances in Romania 
 
 
Number 2005/1. 
▪ Hungarian Foreign Direct Investment Outflows to the Southeast European Countries 
▪ Western Balkan Countries: Outlook for 2005 
▪ Candidate Countries Performed Well Last Year – Outlook for 2005 
Radical Tax Reform in Romania: 16% Flat Tax Rate from 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
